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NOTES
Trust, We Have a Problem:  Chawla ex rel. Giesinger v.
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company, Its
Revelation of a Problem in Insurable Interest Statutes and
the Subsequent Effect on Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts
I. Introduction
Trusts are often considered “the most useful single estate planning device.”1
They are useful because they are flexible, and they are flexible because there
are only six essential elements necessary to establish a trust.   First, one needs2
the intent to create the trust with some form of property.   Second, there needs3
to be property with which to establish the trust, sometimes referred to as the
res.   Third, there must be a trustee–someone to hold and keep safe the4
property within the trust.   Fourth, the trust needs a beneficiary–someone who5
benefits from the trust.   Fifth, there must be a valid trust purpose –a reason6 7
for establishing the trust that is not contrary to law or public policy.   Finally,8
the trust must comply with formalities, such as the Statute of Frauds.   These9
relatively basic requirements result in a death transfer method that can be used
for numerous purposes, both complex and simple.  
The benefits associated with a trust are what make it a popular and effective
method of passing property at death outside of probate.  Significantly, a trust
provides for asset management via the trustee.   This is especially attractive10
to parents looking to protect young children by appointing someone to handle
financial affairs should the parents die.   The trustee aspect of the trust is also11
valuable for elderly individuals whose children or spouse are mentally or
physically incapable of making financial decisions, but are still healthy
enough to potentially outlive the capable elder.   The existence and12
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continuance of a trust is unaffected by the creator’s later incompetency,
incapacity, physical disability or similar misfortune.   Another benefit13
associated with trusts is that because trust property is not considered a probate
asset, time and cost savings result from probate avoidance.   And last, the14
transfer of estate property through a trust can result in substantial tax
savings.15
Life insurance is an agreement between an individual policy holder and an
insurance company essentially declaring that, subject to the payment of
premiums, the insurance company will pay a specified amount to a designated
beneficiary upon the death of the insured.   In fact, life insurance has been16
termed “the most important asset of middle-class Americans.”   This is17
because insurance indemnifies the policy holder against loss, damage, or
liability resulting from unknown or contingent events.18
Many individuals have combined the benefits of life insurance with the
benefits of a trust.   They do so by establishing a trust, purchasing a life19
insurance policy, and requesting that the insurance company issue a policy
naming the trustee as owner and/or beneficiary of the policy.   Thus, the life20
insurance proceeds will be distributed according to the trust.  A potential
problem once existed because the res of the trust is technically a future claim
to insurance money, meaning that at the time of the trust’s formation there was
no property with which to establish that trust.  Trust law, however, has
subsequently been found to be “flexible enough to allow future profits to be
a sufficient ‘interest’ to sustain a trust.”21
In theory, the combination of the life insurance policy and the trust added
another necessary element to the trust’s original six–an element that emanates
from the requirements of an insurance policy.  For an insurance policy–either
in life or in property–to be valid, “[t]he person taking out the policy must have
an insurable interest in the subject matter of the insurance.”   Thus, for a trust22
to be the valid policy holder of life insurance and thereafter receive life
insurance benefits, the trust must have an insurable interest in the individual
insured.  
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An insurable interest is defined as “[a] legal interest in another person’s life
or health or in the protection of property from injury, loss, destruction, or
pecuniary damage.”   An individual possesses an insurable interest in an23
insured subject matter when the individual is so related to or concerned with
the subject matter as to “derive a pecuniary benefit or advantage from its
preservation, or [] suffer a pecuniary loss or damage from its destruction,
termination, or injury by the happening of the event insured against.”   For24
example, a wife has an insurable interest in her husband because she is so
related to her husband that she derives a pecuniary benefit from his survival,
such as his financial contribution to the household.   The wife would also
suffer a pecuniary loss from her husband’s death–i.e. the loss of any such
financial support.  
In general, the issuance of an insurance policy is void unless the person
taking out the policy has an insurable interest in the subject matter of the
policy.   Thus, an insurance company cannot issue a life insurance policy to25
an entity lacking the required insurable interest in the insured’s life or health.
The purpose is to prevent individuals from intentionally destroying property
or killing another to receive insurance benefits, as well as “to prevent the use
of insurance contracts for gambling or wagering.”   Each state dictates what26
qualifies as an “insurable interest,” either through common law or, more
frequently, state statute.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in
Chawla ex rel. Giesinger v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co.,
helped expose an issue common to many state insurable interest statutes.   In27
analyzing Maryland’s insurable interest provisions, the court noted how
Maryland’s statute, by restricting the scope of an insurable interest to (a) those
related by blood or law, (b) those holding an interest in the continuation of the
life of the individual, and (c) those involved in a contract or option for
specified business purchases and sales, effectively eliminated the potential for
any trustee to be a holder of a valid insurable interest in the insured of a life
insurance policy.  28
This discovery could have startling effects for all individuals involved in
the numerous trusts established as owners of life insurance policies.  The
statutory problem exposes trustees to causes of action on behalf of the estate
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of the decedent and potentially subjects that trustee to fiduciary liability
resulting from the purchase and payment of premiums on an invalid policy.29
Moreover, an estate representative may be subject to personal liability if he
or she declines to pursue an action on behalf of the estate against the trustee
of the trust.   30
This note analyzes the court’s decision in Chawla, explores the
repercussions of the problem exposed by the decision, and proposes a
legislative solution involving a statutory amendment for those states that either
lack statutes addressing the issue or whose current statutes contain the flaw.
Part II of this note examines the circumstances involved in the formation of
the Chawla dispute.  Part III discusses the holding of the district court and
how the court exposed the flaw in Maryland’s insurable interest statute.  Part
IV analyzes the implications of the Chawla decision and discusses the status
of insurable interest statutes across the United States.  Part IV examines why
the restriction on the scope of insurable interest is a problem, discusses the
issues raised by it, and surveys possible solutions.  This note concludes in Part
V.
II. Chawla ex rel. Giesinger v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance
Company: The Problem Unveiled
A. The Facts
Harald E. Giesinger applied for a one million dollar life insurance policy
with Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co. (Transamerica) in May of
2000.   Harald named Vera Chawla the owner and beneficiary of the policy,31
but Transamerica stated that Chawla lacked an insurable interest in Harald’s
life.   Subsequently, Harald changed the name of the owner and beneficiary32
of the life insurance policy to the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust,” for which
Harald and Chawla served as co-trustees.   Transamerica issued the policy33
based on the information provided in the application.   In his application,34
Harald falsified his medical history and failed to disclose numerous medical
procedures undergone and diagnoses given between the end of 1999 and the
beginning of 2000.   Harald Giesinger died in September of 2001.   35 36
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Chawla entered a claim for benefits under the life insurance policy as
trustee of the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust.”   Transamerica rescinded the37
policy, refunded the premiums, and denied Chawla’s claim, stating that the
policy was invalid because of the misrepresentations made by Harald in the
application.   Chawla filed suit against Transamerica for breach of contract,38
and Transamerica asserted a counterclaim for fraud.   Both Chawla and39
Transamerica filed for summary judgment.40
The question posed before the district court was whether the life insurance
policy issued to the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust” was enforceable.   The41
court ultimately decided the life insurance policy was void and, therefore,
validly rescinded by Transamerica.  42
III. The Integral Question of Chawla: Why Did the Court Hold the Life
Insurance Policy Issued to the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust” Void?
The court found Transamerica’s rescission of the life insurance policy
appropriate for two reasons.   First, the rescission was valid because of the43
material misrepresentations made by Harald in the life insurance application.44
Those misrepresentations, in and of themselves, were enough to render the
policy void.   It is the district court’s second line of reasoning, however, that45
fuels the discussion at hand.  The court declared the life insurance policy void
because, under Maryland law, the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust” lacked an
insurable interest in Giesinger’s life.   46
Maryland law stated that “[b]efore a person can validly procure insurance
upon the life of another, he must have an insurable interest in that life.”47
Further, the Maryland Code dictated that a life insurance policy may not be
procured by a person “unless the benefits . . . are payable to: (i) the individual
insured; (ii) the individual insured’s personal representative; or (iii) a person
with an insurable interest in the individual insured at the time the insurance
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contract was made.”   A “person” under Maryland law is “an individual,48
receiver, trustee, guardian, personal representative, fiduciary, representative
of any kind, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.”   In49
this case, the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust” is deemed the “person”
procuring the life insurance policy.   The trust is not the individual insured50
nor is the trust the personal representative of the individual insured.51
Therefore, Chawla needed to show that the “Harald Giesinger Special Trust”
held a valid insurable interest in Giesinger’s life.   52
Maryland law provided three means to establish an insurable interest.53
First, in those “related closely by blood or law, a substantial interest
engendered by love and affection is an insurable interest.”   Second, an54
insurable interest exists in one who has “a lawful and substantial economic
interest in the continuation of the life, health, [and] bodily safety of the
individual,” with the additional clarification that “an interest that arises only
by, or would be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement, or injury of the
individual is not an insurable interest.”   Third, an insurable interest can be55
found in parties involved in limited business settings; essentially, the contract
or option for sale or purchase of interest in a business partnership or stock
shares in a closed corporation.56
The “Harald Giesinger Special Trust” failed to meet any of the three
avenues provided by the statute.   First, the trust could not establish an57
insurable interest under the first prong via a close relationship by blood or law
to Harald.   Second, the trust could not establish an insurable interest under58
the second prong because it stood to gain more from Harald’s death, due to the
death benefits under the policy, than it would if Harald remained alive.   The59
trust “suffered no detriment, pecuniary or otherwise, upon the death of the
decedent.”   Finally, the trust could not establish an insurable interest under60
the third prong because the trust was not a business, trade, or partnership, and
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no contract for the sale or purchase of a business was involved.   As a result61
of the trustee’s failure to establish the possession of an insurable interest in
the life of Harald, the court held that the insurance policy naming the “Harald
Giesinger Special Trust” as beneficiary was void and validly rescinded by
Transamerica.  62
Chawla appealed the summary judgment granted by the district court.63
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding
Transamerica’s rescission of the policy based on the misrepresentations made
in the life insurance application, but vacated the district court’s ruling that the
policy could also be rescinded because the trust lacked an insurable interest
in the individual insured.   The Fourth Circuit stated that after appropriately64
awarding summary judgment based on the misrepresentation issue, the district
court should have exercised judicial restraint and refrained from unnecessarily
addressing the insurable interest issue.   65
Despite the Fourth Circuit vacating any law established by the district court
relating to the insurable interest issue, the problem with the statute’s insurable
interest provisions now stands in a spotlight.
IV. The Questions that Count: Analysis of the Chawla Decision
To understand why the Chawla decision is noteworthy, it is important to
understand who is affected by the ruling and what exactly that effect
comprises.  After understanding the problem Chawla exposes, a means for
developing a solution needs to be addressed.
A. The First Relevant Question . . . Who Cares?
The Chawla decision cannot and should not be viewed as an isolated
incident.  Unfortunately, many states insurable interest provisions are
analogous, if not identical, to Maryland’s statue in Chawla.   These states66
follow the same basic pattern of recognizing insurable interests in a limited
number of situations, none of which include trustee status under a trust due to
receive benefits from a life insurance policy.   For example, in Alaska, an67
individual cannot procure life insurance “unless the benefits under the contract
are payable to the individual insured, the personal representatives of the
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individual insured, or to a person having, at the time the contract was made,
an insurable interest in the individual insured.”   There are three methods68
under Alaska law to establish an insurable interest.   First, an individual can69
hold an insurable interest if the individual is “related closely by blood or by
law, a substantial interest engendered by love and affection.”   Second, an70
insurable interest exists in one who holds “a lawful and substantial economic
interest in having the life, health, or bodily safety of the person insured
continue, as distinguished from an interest that would arise only by, or would
be enhanced in value by, the death, disablement, or injury of the individual
insured.”   Third, individuals who are party to a contract for the purchase or71
sale of a business or stock hold an insurable interest.72
If an Alaska court were forced to analyze the validity of an insurance policy
issued to a trust in Alaska, the result should technically be the same as that
reached in Chawla.  That trust would be found to lack an insurable interest in
the insured and the policy would, therefore, be held void.
There are currently twenty states that do not contain a provision within
their insurable interest statutes that establishes such an interest in the trustee
of a trust.   Eleven states, including Delaware and Virginia, do contain a73
provision within their statutes that establishes an insurable interest in the
trustee of a trust.   Two of those eleven, Alabama and Oklahoma, just74
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recently amended their insurable interest statute, likely in response to the
concerns raised by the Chawla decision.75
Many states lack specific statutes defining what constitutes an insurable
interest.   In these states, common law dictates whether an insurance policy76
with a trust as holder should be held void for absence of an insurable interest
in the insured.
B. The Follow Up Questions . . . Why Do We Care?  What Does This
Mean?: The Effects of Chawla’s Revelation
The Chawla decision potentially influences trust law in at least twenty
states, and the effects can be significant.  Chawla directly impacts the validity
of irrevocable life insurance trusts, the use of which are pervasive throughout
estate planning.   This impact means that the beneficiary of an irrevocable life77
insurance trust could be subject to liability, the trustee of an irrevocable life
insurance trust could be subject to liability, and the decedent’s estate
representative may incur personal liability.  Most importantly, Chawla could
mean the subversion of a testator’s intent, resulting in potentially great losses
to those the testator particularly cared about and actively sought to protect.
1. The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust
An irrevocable trust is a trust that cannot be terminated by the settlor, the
person requesting to establish the trust for the benefit of the third party,  post78
creation.   A life insurance trust is simply a trust containing one or more life79
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insurance policies payable to the trust when the insured dies.   An irrevocable80
life insurance trust (ILIT) is a combination of the two: a trust containing a life
insurance policy payable to the trust upon the death of the insured that cannot
be terminated by the settlor.   ILITs are frequently used by estate planners as81
a method of transferring property at death  because the ILIT has all the82
benefits of life insurance combined with the advantages of a trust.   The life83
insurance helps establish an estate, stimulates pecuniary saving, and
safeguards loved ones and friends from the potentially crippling financial
burden resulting from the early death of a provider.   The trust provides the84
ability to plan for future contingencies.   The ILIT also delivers certain85
bonuses in regards to tax breaks and creditors’ rights.   In fact, ILITs are so86
popular that many “how to” guides are printed to aid estate planners in
establishing ILITs for their clients.87
One reason ILITs may be favored is because their use allows for the non-
probate transfer of the subject property, thereby avoiding the often tedious
accompaniments that probate confers.   Also, with an ILIT, the death benefits88
paid out of the policy are neither subject to income tax  nor included in the89
decedent’s estate for potential federal estate tax purposes.   ILITs can be90
advantageous for numerous individuals.  They are frequently established as
the beneficiary for life insurance policies on behalf of family members.91
They may be purchased during divorce proceedings to ensure readily available
cash for alimony and child support payments.   Further, ILITs may be92
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established for individuals who are not related by blood to the individual, such
as long-time friends or employees, and they can also be used to care for
individuals with special needs.93
The flaw in many irrevocable interest statutes, as revealed in Chawla, is
that the trust, the entity to whom the death benefits of the life insurance policy
comprising the ILIT are to be paid, does not have an insurable interest in the
life of the individual insured.  Subsequently, these trusts could be held void,
giving rise to several problematic repercussions.
2. The Potentially Extreme Problem with the Statute “As Is”: TheImpact on Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts
Keeping in mind the extensive use of ILITs by estate planners, holding
these numerous ILITs void for lack of an insurable interest triggers the
possibility of several adverse consequences.  In several states, if the
beneficiary or other payee of a life insurance policy issued in violation of the
insurable interest statute receives any benefits accrued upon the death,
disability, or injury of the individual insured, either the insured, an executor,
or an administrator may maintain an action to recover such benefits from the
person receiving them.   Thus, in the situation of an ILIT held void for lack94
of an insurable interest, the estate of the decedent has an action against the
beneficiary of the ILIT for the benefits from the trust.   The creation of this95
cause of action will often be moot because the beneficiaries of the estate of the
decedent and the beneficiaries under the ILIT are frequently the same
individuals: the decedent’s family members.  However, in those instances
where the beneficiary of the ILIT is not a beneficiary of the estate, such as in
the case of a close friend, the action may be aggressively pursued.   Further,96
one can deduce that those cases in which the decedent chooses to leave
property to a non-family member are also those situations where a trust is
most likely to be used so that the property will pass outside of probate.97
Additionally, by purchasing and paying premiums on a life insurance policy
that lacks an insurable interest, the trustee of the ILIT may be subject to
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liability.   One of the primary responsibilities of a trustee is to “preserve and98
maintain trust assets.”   This duty requires the trustee to ensure that the trust99
property is not subject to waste or diminution in value, and it also requires the
trustee to ensure the trust property is productive.   Paying the premiums on100
an invalid life insurance policy is, in essence, a loss for the trust.  For
example, after the purchase of a life insurance policy, premiums are paid over
a number of years to maintain the policy and keep it active.   If a policy is101
held void due to a lack of an insurable interest, those premiums are returned,
assuming the policy was not procured by fraud.   Although the premiums are102
returned, the profit that could have been earned, such as interest on alternative
investment methods, is foregone.  These lost profits constitute a loss to the
trust.  Thus, by establishing and maintaining the invalid life insurance policy
with the resulting loss to the beneficiaries, the trustee of the ILIT has failed
his or her duty to make the trust property productive.    Trustees are  “liable103
for losses if there is a breach of trust or breach of duty [and] the beneficiaries
of a trust may sue a trustee to recover profits or recoup losses resulting from
the trustee’s breach of any of its duties.”   The end result: the trustee of the104
ILIT is exposed to liability.
If a trust is found to be invalid, there is the further possibility that the
trustee could be held liable for payments or conveyances made as directed
under that invalid trust.   Some courts have concluded that holding the105
trustee accountable for payments made as directed is unfair because the trustee
is simply complying with the settlor’s intentions.   To mitigate this liability,106
these courts have adopted the view of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,107
which states that the trustee should be liable “if, but only if, when he made
such payment or conveyance he knew that the trust was invalid or had or
should have had reasonable doubt as to its validity.”   108
In the case of the ILIT, in connection with the trustee’s knowledge or doubt
as to the trust’s validity, the possibility that an ILIT trustee will be held liable
for payments or conveyances made under the invalid trust likely depends on
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his or her individual representation of skill.   The fact that a trustee is under109
a duty to exercise due care, diligence, and skill in administering the trust, or
else be held liable for resulting losses to the trust estate, is ubiquitous in trust
law.   The standard measure of care required of a trustee in administering the110
trust is to “exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would
exercise in dealing with his own property . . . .”   There is an exception,111
however, if the trustee has special or professional knowledge or skill,  “or112
procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill
than that of a man of ordinary prudence . . . .”   Under such circumstances,113
the trustee assumes a duty to administer the trust according to this higher level
of skill.   Thus, if the trustee of the ILIT possesses greater knowledge114
regarding trust administration and law, such as that of an attorney, then it is
very possible that the court will take into account his or her expertise and find
that the trustee should have been aware of the problem regarding insurable
interests and its effect on ILITs, and subsequently had reasonable doubt as to
the validity of the ILIT.  
Trustees have been held responsible for payments or conveyances made
under an invalid trust regardless of lack of knowledge of invalidity or lack of
reasonable doubt as to validity.   This liability is based on the theory that,115
because the trustee can always request from a court both a determination of
a trust’s validity and a determination of the trustee’s duties under the trust, the
trustee likewise has the ability to ensure that any payments he or she makes
in accordance with the trust are valid.   Therefore, it is possible that a failure116
of the trustee to ensure the validity of a trust before making any trust
conveyances could be found tantamount to a failure of the trustee to act within
his or her duty to preserve and maintain trust assets.  A breach of a trustee’s
duties results in the imposition of just liability.   117
In the case of ILITs, it is likely the court would only hold liable those
trustees who either were appointed trustee post-revelation of the insurable
interest problem or who, for some reason or another, should have been aware
of the exposure of the problem.  These trustees, before initiating or making
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any further distributions under the trust, could have petitioned the court for a
validity determination.  Courts, hopefully now aware of the issue, can properly
inform trustees whether the trusts are invalid.  For those trustees whose ILITs
were established before the revelation of the issue, courts will likely waive
liability if the trustee previously requested that the court verify the validity of
the trust’s insurable interest and was informed that the trust was sound.  
Liability may also be incurred by the decedent’s estate representative if he
or she chooses to forego a claim against the trustee of an ILIT.  The personal
representative of an estate owes a fiduciary duty to each beneficiary of the
estate to bargain for their rights and allocate to them their share of the
estate.   Accompanying this fiduciary duty is “a mandatory duty to seek out118
and collect every asset” of the estate.   If the personal representative “fails119
to recover estate assets,” he or she is personally accountable.   Often, and120
likely having been chosen by the testator in part for this very reason, the
personal representative will seek to enforce the testator’s intent.   For121
example, if the personal representative knows that the testator intended for the
proceeds of a life insurance policy to go to someone other than the
beneficiaries of the estate, the personal representative may opt not to pursue
a claim against the trustee of an invalid ILIT.  This action may subsequently
expose the personal representative to personal liability.   Again, this is most122
likely a claim that will only be pursued when the beneficiaries of the estate are
not those who will receive the benefits of the life insurance policy under the
ILIT.
The drafting attorney of the ILIT may also be held liable for negligence
associated with the trust creation.  Attorneys must exercise care in writing a
will or inter vivos trust to protect the rights and interests of those who could
foreseeably be injured by an improper drafting.   Some courts find that the123
attorney owes this fiduciary duty to both the client and the intended
beneficiaries under the instrument.   If the client or intended beneficiary124
suffers “deprivation as a result of a mistake in the drafting of the will or trust,”
the drafting attorney could be held liable in tort.   A client could maintain an125
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action based on tort theories of negligence,  breach of contract,  and breach126 127
of fiduciary duty.   An intended beneficiary, despite a lack of privity with the128
drafting attorney, may have a cause of action based on “the contractual theory
of third-party beneficiary, or the tort theories of negligence or quasi-
offense.”   If unaware that the potential problem in the insurable interest129
statute might invalidate the trust, an attorney currently drafting an ILIT could
be held liable to both the client or the client’s estate and any intended
beneficiaries under the ILIT.
Finally, philosophically, the invalidation of these types of trusts thoroughly
trounces the testator’s wishes associated with the creation of the trust.  An
individual who establishes a trust in an effort to make a testamentary
disposition of property has likely invested considerable time, thought, and
money into a legally and realistically effective estate plan.  Within the law of
wills and trusts, the testator’s intent is of paramount import.   Why in this130
instance–that of an ILIT– should courts ignore that intent?  In the most benign
case, one where the beneficiary of the trust and the beneficiary of the estate
are the same, all that is lost is income that could have been earned from the
money had it been kept in a different form, such as an interest-bearing
account.  But in the most harmful cases, where the positions of the beneficiary
under the trust and the beneficiary of the estate are in direct opposition, an
individual for whom the testator truly cared could lose the support the testator
intentionally provided.  It would seem that the rejection of the testator’s intent
in these cases imposes too great a loss.
C. The Biggest Question . . . What Is the Solution?
Admitting there is a problem is the first step, and by far the easiest portion
of this analysis.  Determining and implementing a solution is certainly the
more time-consuming and challenging step.  
In those states that lack statutes establishing what constitutes an insurable
interest, the definition is derived from common law.  Common law is law of
necessity and exists only in the absence of statutory law.   While131
fundamentally immutable, common law should and must change when change
is necessary.   Change in common law states can be effectuated by either the132
legislature through the adoption of a statute, or through courts via rulings that
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subsequently create and change the law.   Change through the court system133
can be a long process, not only because a court must wait for an appropriate
case through which to effectuate the change, but also because courts are
always reluctant to modify precedent.   Legislation would be the more134
effective and efficient route in those states that do not already have established
statutory definitions of insurable interests.  To sufficiently amend the situation
and overwrite the common law, legislatures must remember to expressly state
that the statute is repealing the common law rule, must be sufficiently broad
and specific to cover every aspect of that common law rule, and must provide
an adequate substitute remedy.   135
In the case of the ILIT lacking a necessary insurable interest compliant with
statutory provisions, a request to the court to solve the issue presents two
possible outcomes.  On one hand, the court could find, as the Chawla court
did, that the ILIT lacks an insurable interest in the insured, and therefore, the
insurance policy is invalid.   As stated, the detrimental repercussions of this136
decision would be numerous.   At the very least, there would be an increase137
in litigation given the causes of action that could arise after determining
invalidity.  Further, there would be a flurry of different opinions on how to
impose “liability” on those individuals potentially held responsible.  The court
could either provide leniency due to the prior common and frequent use of the
ILIT without any indication of doubt as to validity, or the court could strictly
follow the law, and under that law, find those individuals liable.  
On the other hand, the court could determine that the trust does, in fact,
hold an insurable interest in the insured.  To do this, however, the court could
not merely interpret the current insurable interest statutory provision, at least
not through strict construction.  The court would have to be judicially active
and in essence create a new insurable interest in the trust.  This is a
“separation of powers” 101 issue: it is the province of the legislature to write
the law and the province of the judiciary to interpret that law.   As the138
problem arises out of the insurable interest provisions of state statutes,  the139
appropriate solution lies with the creators of those statutes: the legislatures.
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Because of both the frequency of and the benefits to using ILITs,
legislatures should develop language to validate a life insurance policy held
by a trust otherwise lacking an insurable interest.   This could be140
accomplished by extending the list of valid insurable interests to include one
established in the trustee of a trust.   141
Delaware law, via three methods, instills an insurable interest in the trustee
of a trust.   Simplified, Delaware’s statute states first, for federal income tax142
purposes, the trustee of a trust has an insurable interest in the life of the
individual who established the trust.   Second, for a trust with a res including143
life insurance proceeds, the trustee of the trust has an insurable interest in the
life of the individual who established the trust.   Third, for a trust with144
multiple beneficiaries funded by life insurance proceeds, the trustee of the
trust has an insurable interest in the life of the individual equivalent to the
aggregate of those beneficiaries.   Although the Delaware legislature145
addressed the issue, the statute is wordy and difficult to understand.146
Because a change in the law should provide clarity through understandable
and concise language, patterning a statutory revision upon the Delaware
statute is not advisable.
A different option for correcting the problem exposed in Chawla would be
to model legislative change after Virginia’s law, which instills in the trustee
of a trust an insurable interest in “(i) the individual insured who established
the trust, (ii) each individual in whose life the owner of the trust for federal
income tax purposes has an insurable interest, and (iii) each individual in
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
142 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:125
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(B)(5) (West 2007).
148. Id. 
149. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104(3) (2007).
150. Id.
151. Id. 
152. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 415 (2007).
153. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 245 (2008).
154. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 646 (2008).
155. Id.
whose life a beneficiary of the trust has an insurable interest.”   This clear,147
precise wording covers the issue exposed by Chawla by providing specifically
that the trustee of the trust has an insurable interest in the individual
insured.148
A third possibility is to follow the straightforward approach of Utah.149
Utah law provides a “nonexhaustive list of insurable interests.”   Included150
on the list is the statement that “[a] trust has an insurable interest in the
subject of the insurance to the extent that a beneficiary of the trust has the
insurable interest.”   This is by far the most succinct and yet still effective151
state statutory revision of the insurable interest provisions.  Depending on the
level of specificity with which state legislatures might wish to approach
amending current statutes, following the example of either Virginia or Utah
would be sufficient to validate the ILIT.
Along with the adoption of new statutory language, state legislatures
adopting such changes should deem the amendment to have retroactive effect.
It is true that ex post facto law is typically prohibited and often correctly so.152
This prohibition is appropriate because it often involves instances where the
retroactive effect would criminalize conduct that was legal when performed.153
Criminalizing conduct that was legal when performed is a violation of an
individual’s right to due process, specifically, notification prior to action that
his or her conduct might result in unfavorable legal consequences.   Trust154
law, however, is not a situation of criminal conduct, but rather one of civil
technicalities.  Retroactive law is sometimes allowed in civil contexts.   155
Presently, there are numerous trusts established as the taker under a life
insurance policy.  These trusts were created without any associated fraud or
peccant intent, and under the assumption that they were a valid testamentary
act.  The legislature should seek to protect those trusts and give effect to the
intent of settlors by according any amended statute retroactive status.  
V: The Bottom Line: Address the Problem
The problem exposed in Chawla is that every existing ILIT could be void
in those states lacking statutory recognition of an insurable interest in the
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trustee of a trust named as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.  This
problem is pervasive in United States statutes and, due to the resulting harmful
consequences, will soon need to be addressed in state legislatures.  Some
states may prefer to allow the issue to be determined through judicial means,
but the most effective solution lies in legislative amendment.  This solution
would be best obtained by adopting language patterned after the current Utah
law which, as one in a nonexhaustive list of insurable interests, vests an
insurable interest in the trustee of a trust listed as the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy.156
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